A couple of columns ago we spoke about TSA’s new passenger screeners training program for anger management due to the “Rodney Dangerfield Effect” -- we don’t get no respect. TSA came up with an additional answer, just in case the training doesn’t pan out: a big ol’ police-style badge and a different color shirt. A TSA official was quoted as saying, “We coupled the badges with the communications training to make it clear to our officers that they're there to facilitate our passengers”. Yup, that oughta do it. I’m not sure I understand the segue. I had offered the observation that maybe people are angry because of the way they are being treated in the first place. Silly me. I was about to go for a rather crude joke here, but unfortunately, those guys have rarely demonstrated a sense of humor.

The badge issue has created no small amount of concern among those who actually are airport police, who carry guns and have arrest powers (TSA has neither). Airport cops worry that their own authority will be undercut by screeners who are being made to look like federal police. Says Duane McGray of the Airport Law Enforcement Agencies Network, an airport police association, "It's another way of saying (to airport police), 'You're not important.'”

In a related development, TSA has also initiated some pilot programs at seven airports to test the concept of screening those thousands of employees who enter the secure area every day. In their defense, it’s a Congressional legislative requirement, but from a purely security point of view, there are a lot of operational concerns. Not the least of those is a cost/benefit analysis, but that’s one of the goals of a pilot program – to see if it’s really a worthwhile exercise. A study done for the Airports Council International estimates the annual cost at $6.5 billion nationwide.

To be sure, the insider threat always has been and will continue to be a significant concern. The pilots are each testing different concepts and their operational impacts, from 100 percent employee and vehicle screening at random locations and times, to behavior detection, awareness training, and biometric IDs. There is both strength and weakness in the implementation of random screening; you never know where you may be screened next, but once begun at Portal A, it’s not too difficult for one with evil intent to simply head for Portal B instead.

Although the pilot programs are not yet complete, there has clearly been some positive effect simply in the visibility of the process. As one large airport related to me, people are now reminded constantly of the requirements for a secured environment, and it appears to have actually cut down both on restricted items coming into the area, and in general throughput at the door, although the latter may simply be a reaction of employees who are purposefully avoiding being screened.

As always, silliness ensues. Does the Cinnabon lady really need to be screened eleven times a day? Does an armed law enforcement officer require screening before entering the secure area? I swear both are true. Surely there will be lessons learned and changes made. Data is being aggressively collected, but I suspect the $15 million cost of the 90-day pilots (in truth, not “new” money, but diverted from other programs) may end up being an expensive way of proving a negative.